The LibCon coalition’s first mistake (excepting any original sin) seems to be requiring a supermajority of 55% for motions of no confidence motions of no confidence leading to dissolution. There’s already a protest group.
Andrew Rudalevige explains the significance of 55% very succinctly at the Monkey Cage. (I’m not aware of any other supermajority requirements in UK politics, but pipe up in comments if you know of some).
It’s an ugly solution. I can understand the need to bind the coalition together — and indeed to make it more difficult to bring down the government — but there are a number of intermediate solutions.
One could require confidence motions to have the support of a majority of members of the House, instead of a majority of those voting. As far as I can see, this would have prevented the 1979 fall of the Callaghan government: Callaghan lost 311-310, but a 50%+1 majority would have been 318.
The second option would be to go the German route, and require that votes of no confidence be constructive. But this wouldn’t protect the Tories against a LibDem defection to a Rainbow coalition.
Neither solution would bind the coalition so totally as the 55% solution does — but neither is so objectionable.
Update: Nice briefing note from the Constitution Unit at UCL:
“Some commentators appear to have confused a dissolution resolution moved by the government, and a confidence motion tabled by the opposition. On no confidence motions tabled by the opposition parties, the normal 50% threshold should continue to apply.”
But how does this square with the sovereignty of Parliament? As far as I’m aware the only supermajority requirement currently in existence relates to the HRA, and that’s very largely symbolic – repealing the HRA would be more trouble than it would be worth anyway, since the UK would still be bound by the ECHR. In this case, to quote from my comment on the LRB blog, all that would be needed would be for the non-Tory majority to pass an amendment (to whatever Bill was handy) suspending the operation of the 55% Act, and viola. To avert that, they’d need to have some provision to the effect that the 55% Act could only be repealed by a 55% majority… and that the 55% Act (Majority For Repeal) Regulations could only be amended by a 55% majority… and that the 55% Act (Majority For Repeal) Regulations (Majority For Repeal) Regulations could only be amended…
Link | May 13th, 2010 at 10:03 am
I think the procedure you outline would be perfectly possible — I’m guessing that the coalition would view this process as too time-consuming for any eager opposition.
Link | May 13th, 2010 at 12:07 pm
Bear in mind, the option still open to the opposition is to bring down the government without dissolution, requiring between 50 and 55%. Sure, we might have a governo fotocopia, but it would look bad and the incumbents might be punished at the next elections.
Link | May 13th, 2010 at 12:13 pm