• anyone who would support our taking action against Berlusconi is likely to vote for us anyway; but
• there are a large number of people who would oppose action against Berlusconi; and
• we want some of these people to vote for us

Why did they assume that there were a large number of people who would oppose action against Berlusconi? The assumption might seem puzzling: who would object to less political control over the media, if not the politicians?

Yet on the one occasion when voters were presented with concrete proposals to limit Berlusconi’s influence over the media, they rejected them. In 1995 voters had the chance to vote on three propositions:

• to limit the number of television networks held by any one person;
• to limit the number of commercial breaks;
• to break-up the advertising duopoly held by Rai and Mediaset;

They voted against all three, 57:43, 51:49, 51:49 [results here].
I doubt, however, that the referenda are a very good way of explaining why the left was shy about raising the issue. Referendums have been ignored before: most notably on the public financing of political parties. Voters likely didn’t understand the measures — Fininvest’s advertisements against the referendum were judged misleading by the sectoral watchdog and by the courts. And even if tackling the issue was unpopular, the electoral campaign didn’t need to put it front-and-centre. Instead, it could have been buried deep in the manifesto.

The referendum did show that there was pushing these measures would be unlikely to win additional votes. But I think it’s a stretch to say it should that pushing these measures would lose votes.

One explanation might be that many parties within the broad left-wing coalitions, and many individuals within Italian politics more generally, are inclined to forgive past crimes in order to make life easier or to avoid division.

This is one of two arguments adduced by Paul Ginsborg, in his 2004 book, Silvio Berlusconi : television, power and patrimony:

Most of those who were in the centre of the centre-left came from a Christian Democrat past. They were opposed to taking any determined measures, either of a judicial nature, or regarding Berlusconi’s predominant position in the media (the two issues had become almost inextricably intertwined by this time). For them a policy of laissez-faire and letting bygones be bygones was the wisest one to adopt. Behind such attitudes lay a deep-rooted tendency in Italian political culture, clearly of Catholic origin, towards pardoning and forgetting (p. 91)

And indeed, there have been numerous `amnesties’ in recent Italian political history, and not all on sexy issues like the media: there have been amnesties on immigration, on the building of residences without permits, on tax payments, and so on, most of which have been granted by the centre-right.

In any case, if this argument is correct, then the left hasn’t done more about Berlusconi’s influence on the media because the `centre’ of the `centre-left’ didn’t really want it, and they didn’t really want it because they’re inclined to let sleeping dogs lie.

At the same time, this argument runs against a very different school of thought: that it was not the former Christian Democrats who let Berlusconi off the hook, but rather the former Communists.

In particular – runs the argument – Massimo D’Alema was so keen to play the statesman and agree institutional reform with Berlusconi during the Bicamerale that he let Berlusconi off the hook. Call this the inciucio theory. It seems to me that the inciucio theory and the forgiveness theory can’t both be right.

And whilst Berlusconi’s position may be anomalous, it is certainly not unique. Berlusconi can be (and has been) compared to other media enterpreneurs who have entered politics, such as Ross Perot or Thaksin Shinawatra (Campus 2006, pp. 165-166, Caniglia 2000), though Berlusconi has been far more successful than either of these.

Berlusconi is not even the only Italian politician to own a television company: for a time Vittorio Cecchi Gori (son of the film producer Mario Cecchi Gori) was both a Senator for the Partito Popolare Italiano and owner of Telemontecarlo.

(Members of Berlusconi’s party attempted to make much of this last fact during debates concerning a law that would have required Berlusconi (but not Cecchi Gori) to sell his holdings. They did not succeed).

References:

Soria Blatmann. Italy: A Media Conflict of Interest: Anomaly in Italy. Technical
report, Reporters sans frontières, April 2003.
Johanna Boogerd-Quaak. Report on the risks of violation, in the EU and es-
pecially in Italy, of freedom of expression and information (Article 11(2) of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights). Report A5-0230/2004, European Parlia-
ment, 5 April 2004.
Donatella Campus. L’antipolitica al governo: De Gaulle, Reagan, Berlusconi. Il
mulino, 2006.
E. Caniglia. Berlusconi, Perot e Collor come political outsider: media, marketing e
sondaggi nella costruzione del consenso politico. Rubbettino, 2000.
Miklós Haraszti. Visit to Italy: the Gasparri Law: Observations and Recom-
mendations. Technical report, Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, Representative on Freedom of the Media, 7 June 2005.

Berlusconi’s government is now trying to prevent that ruling from having effect. Not only that, but they’re doing it in a very under-hand way.

In April, just before the elections, the Prodi government put together a bumper package of small changes to bring Italian law into line with recent rulings at the European level. The law, consisting of fourteen articles, was pretty uncontroversial: speaking for my part, I find it difficult to become excited about water regulation.

The Berlusconi government has now introduced an amendment to one of these articles – which previously, and somewhat improbably, concerned regulations of open-sea fishing  – which effectively negates the ECJ’s ruling. As far as I can understand from the amendment, all frequencies already assigned are to remain assigned until the transition to digital.

To say that this shows blatant disrespect for European law is to put it mildly. In truth, I doubt it’s even a very good way of avoiding the judgement: the judgement still has to be put into Italian law by the Consiglio di Stato, which originally referred the matter; but given the clarity of the ruling it’s difficult to see how the Consiglio di Stato can do anything but affirm the Court’s ruling in precedence to all other Italian legislation – including, if passed, this amendment.

Even worse, the issue of Retequattro is just a skirmish in a much wider battle concerning the legality of the Gasparri law governing telecommunications – which is already subject to a letter of formal notice from the Commission. More on the Europa 7 case [in Italian] at  Wikipedia.

AFFARI ESTERI
Stefania Gabriella Anastasia CRAXI – Forza Italia
Alfredo MANTICA – Alleanza Nazionale
Enzo SCOTTI – MpA

INTERNO
Michelino DAVICO – Lega Nord
Alfredo MANTOVANO – Alleanza Nazionale
Nitto Francesco PALMA – Forza Italia

GIUSTIZIA
Maria Elisabetta ALBERTI CASELLATI – Forza Italia
Giacomo CALIENDO – PdL

DIFESA
Giuseppe COSSIGA – Forza Italia
Guido CROSETTO – Forza Italia

ECONOMIA E FINANZE
Luigi CASERO – Forza Italia
Nicola COSENTINO – Forza Italia
Alberto GIORGETTI – Alleanza Nazionale
Daniele MOLGORA – Lega Nord
Giuseppe VEGAS – Forza Italia

SVILUPPO ECONOMICO
Ugo MARTINAT – Alleanza Nazionale
Paolo ROMANI – Forza Italia
Adolfo URSO – Alleanza Nazionale

POLITICHE AGRICOLE E FORESTALI
Antonio BUONFIGLIO – Alleanza Nazionale

AMBIENTE E TUTELA DEL TERRITORIO E DEL MARE
Roberto MENIA – Alleanza Nazionale

INFRASTRUTTURE E TRASPORTI
Roberto CASTELLI – Lega Nord
Bartolomeo GIACHINO -non-partisan?
Mario MANTOVANI – Forza Italia
Giuseppe Maria REINA – MpA

LAVORO, SALUTE E POLITICHE SOCIALI
Ferruccio FAZIO – non-partisan?
Francesca MARTINI – Lega Nord
Eugenia Maria ROCCELLA – PdL
Pasquale VIESPOLI – Alleanza Nazionale

ISTRUZIONE, UNIVERSITÀ E RICERCA
Giuseppe PIZZA – Nuova DC

BENI E ATTIVITÀ CULTURALI
Francesco Maria GIRO – Forza Italia

Total tallies:

• Forza Italia – sixteen;
• Alleanza Nazionale – eight;
• Lega Nord – five;
• Mpa – two;

So,

• Alleanza Nazionale gets three more under-secretaries than the Lega Nord to salve its amour propre;
• two technocrats in Giachino (former member of the transport workers’ and providers’ association Confetra) and Fazio (former surgeon) enter the government.
• No strong patterns in terms of ‘monitoring’: the two full Lega ministers each have an under-secretary from Alleanza Nazionale to deal with, as does Tremonti. Economic development looks to be a hotbed of Alleanza Nazionale members: can we expect large numbers of expensive ‘development projects’ in the South?

• Foreign Affairs: Franco Frattini (FI)
• Interior: Roberto Maroni (Lega Nord)
• Justice: Angelino Alfano (AN)
• Defence: Ignazio La Russa (AN)
• Economy: Giulio Tremonti(FI)
• Economic development: Claudio Scajola (FI)
• Agriculture: Luca Zaia (Lega Nord)
• Environment: Stefania Prestigiacomo (FI)
• Infrastructure: Altero Matteoli (AN)
• Labour: Maurizio Sacconi (FI)
• Culture: Sandro Bondi (FI)
• Education: Maria Stella Gelmini (FI)
• Relationships w/ parliament: Elio Vito (FI)
• Federalist reforms: Umberto Bossi (LN)
• ‘Simplification’: Roberto Calderoli (LN)
• Regions: Giancarlo Fitto (FI)
• Equal opportunities: Mara Carfagna (FI)
• EU Affairs: Andrea Ronchi (AN)
• Public administration: Renato Brunetta (FI)
• Youth: Giorgia Meloni (AN)
• Government program: Gianfranco Rotondi (DCA)

The last nine of these are ministers without portfoglio. Appointing ministers without portfoglio is necessary because the number of ministers is limited to 12, whilst the total size of the government (including ministers without portfoglio and under-secretaries) must be less than sixty, a requirement stemming from the legge Bassannini which has unfortunately been honoured more in the breach than in the implementation.

First, AN has done badly. It’s impossible to tell how many votes Alleanza Nazionale brought to the PdL, and thus to tell how much they should “weigh” in the government. But they used to have half of Forza Italia’s vote share, and two-and-a-half times the vote-share of the Lega. They now have a third of the Forza Italia’s ministers, and the same number as the Lega Nord.Granted, Fini is now President of the Camera, which is undoubtedly a source of pride for him (and thus for the party), but to have the same weight as the Lega must smart.

AN might be bought off with a disproportionate number of under-secretaries. There’s some research on the role of under-secretaries in coalition governments which argues that under-secretaries typically come from different parties from the minister in order to act as internal watchdogs: maybe AN will get under-secretaries to ‘watch’ Lega ministers.

Second, there are divergences between FI and AN, and these may cause problems for the government. The PdL campaigned in a reasonably cohesive manner as a single unit, but now that there are posts of power to be had, FI and AN have emerged as distinct units. AN seems not to be dissolving itself, with Fini having handed over party leadership to a ‘regent‘, and with party statutes still to be drawn up. Whether these squabbles are birthing pains or not remains to be seen.

Third, the distribution of the portfolios is very heavily gendered. The four women are all concentrated in ‘caring’ ministries (Environment, Education, Equal Opportunities, Youth policies) and the female ministers are typically much younger than their male colleagues. The commentary in today’s Repubblica about Mara Carfagna is slyly dismissive (in an unusually subtle way for Repubblica: what’s happening?):

” Confermando tutte le previsioni, la donna alla qualeBerlusconi disse in pubblico, ti sposerei subito, se non fossi già sposato”, diventa ministro… Adesso il compito della bella Mara sarà quello di dimostrare che tutte hanno pari opportunità. Anche le altre”.

“Confirming all the forecasts, the woman to whom Berlusconi once said in public, “I would marry you if not married already”, becomes minister… Now the task of the lovely Mara will be to demonstrate that all have equal opportunities. Including all the other women”.

Certainly, Italy has a long way to go before it can catch up with Spain and the wonderful example of Carme Chacón.

Update: the link to Sartori’s editorial got mangled in the comments.

The model [King et al. 1990] depends on seven variables. The two which have changed since Prodi are party system fractionalization and polarization. They’re calculated as follows:

• Fractionalization in the Senate: [Rae index] take the sum of squares of each party’s share of seats, subtract it from 1, and multiple by 1000 to get a nice number: 633.1, in this case.
• Polarization: [according to Powell 1982] take the summed vote share of each ‘extremist’ party in the Senate elections: Lega Nord, Sinistra Arcobaleno, La Destra, Sinistra Critica, Pcl, Grilli Parlanti = 14.9%

The model predicts a mean duration of 37 months, with a standard deviation of 5 and a half months. So, if the model is roughly correct, we can be 95% certain that the Berlusconi government will fall between December 2010 and January 2012. This, of course, does not mean that Berlusconi will exit from the scene during these dates, but that the composition of the government will change, and Berlusconi may be formally re-invested in the same way he was in 2005, when a poor performance in the regional elections caused his resignation and re-appointment.

Of course, this only works if actors respect the law. Berlusconi doesn’t. Instead, he’s been leaking publicising polling info about a continued seven to nine point advantage for the PdL.

Dans la première affaire, le plaignant affirme que le journaliste de TV4 aurait touché 43 500 euros pour diffuser un reportage afin d’aider un détenu condamné à dix ans de réclusion à sortir de prison. Quand la famille du prisonnier aurait voulu récupérer son argent parce que le reportage n’avait pas été diffusé, le journaliste l’aurait alors menacée. Le reporter, qui a également une formation de juriste, ne nie pas le paiement mais affirme qu’il s’est fait payer en temps que conseil juridique.

In Italy, Berlusconi’s corruption trial is apparently back on. How quickly can the judges work before the statute of limitations comes into effect?

More wide-reaching structural changes might come soon. Apparently the new borgerligt government has not granted the (semi-automatic) three year extension to SVT’s charter, promising to think more about the role of SVT and SR. It’s possible Sweden might follow Estonia in unifying their radio and television PSBs.

I found two interesting tid-bits in passing.

• Sveriges Television’s call-sign, SVT, was not their first choice. It would have been STV (Swedish TeleVision, presumably) were it not for the Scottish ITV franchise and EBU member STV, established in 1957 just before SVT. As a Scot, I felt a little bit of national pride in our having beaten our Nordic neighbours to a three-letter acronym.
• SVT managed to annoy many Italians with their ‘Free Television’ campaign, which showed clips of Putin and Berluscon, and ended with the tag – SVT – free television. (See the clip). The Italian government – with Berlusconi as Prime Minister at the time – contacted the Swedish embassy, which rightly replied that it was not the government’s business how SVT advertised itself.