Working out the result of the 2001 Italian general election ‘as if’ the  2005 electoral system had been used is tricky for two reasons.

First, had the 2005 electoral system actually been in place, parties would have changed their strategies, and voters might have (re)acted differently. This holds for any exercise of this kind, in Italy or elsewhere.

Second, there were a number of changes of coalition and changes of party identity over this period. This is a particularly Italian problem.

Nevertheless, let’s assume that we can take the coalitions as they were in 2001, and the parties’ share of the proportional vote in 2001, and calculate a distribution of seats on the basis of the electoral law adopted in 2005.

Let’s start with the Chamber of Deputies. The coalition of the centre-right would have won the election, taking 49.5% of the vote and thus winning the majority bonus of 340 seats.

All five parties in this coalition — Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, the Lega Nord, the UDC, and the Nuovo PSI — would have won seats, since the first four would have passed the 2% threshold for parties in a coalition, and the Nuovo PSI would have been admitted as the `largest loser’ in the coalition.

Within this coalition, the seats would have been divided proportionally (largest remainder, IIRC), and so Forza Italia would have had 202 seats (29.4 / 49.5 * 340), Alleanza Nazionale 82,  the Lega Nord 27, the UDC 22, and the Nuovo PSI 7.

Two other lists or coalitions would have won seats — the coalition of the centre-left (35%), and Rifondazione Comunista (5%). Rifondazione Comunista would have got a proportional share of the remaining 290 seats (in 2001 there were not the 12 seats for Italians living abroad), or 5 / 40 * 290, or around 36 seats. The centre-left would have taken the remaining seats.

The Radicals and Italia dei Valori would have (narrowly in the case of the latter) failed to reach the 4% threshold for lists not belonging to a coalition. They would not have won any seats.

For the Senate, it’s more difficult to say, since the parties in the two coalitions ran under a single label. From eye-balling the figures for each coalition, the centre-right would still have a majority in the Senate, since it would be roughly thirty seats short of a majority just on the basis of the majority bonuses in each region alone. Rifondazione Comunista would not have surpassed the 8% threshold in any region, but Italia dei Valori would have met that target in Molise.

The fascinating thing about the site is that it’ll tell you whichEuropean party comes closest to your positions, throughout all of Europe. I came closest to the Pirate Bay, then the Croatian Social Liberal Party. Disregarding issue salience, I was closest tothe Latvian Society for Political Change, so small it doesn’t even have its own Wikipedia page (AFAIK).

There’s only one thing missing — by the end of it I wanted a tool which would tell me which country to move to based on my political preferences. I think it’s the Netherlands –GL, PvdA and D66 all matched me quite closely — but I’d like to see a political compass with countries plotted instead of parties…

Yet as a consequence of Deaglio’s arguments – which seem unconvincing and have been found to be so by the judicial system – the Italian Senate Committee for Elections has moved to recount the blank, wasted, and spoilt votes in seven regions.

It’s not clear why these particular regions were chosen. They include regions won by the left and by the right, by narrow margins and by huge margins:

• Campania – 0.5% gap in favour of the left
• Calabria – 14.2% gap in favour of the left
• Lazio – 1.1% gap in favour of the right
• Lombardia – 14.3% gap in favour of the right
• Puglia – 4% in favour of the right
• Sicilia – 17.3% in favour of the right
• Toscana – 22.6% gap in favour of the left

Would be interesting to get a breakdown of the number of blank and spoiled ballots by region, and see whether the number of contested ballots in Campania and Lazio could result in a re-allocation of seats. Unfortunately, the Interior Ministry doesn’t seem to have this data.

Overall, of the twenty-three large comunes, fourteen went to the centre-left, four to the centre-right, with the remainder in the balance. This represents a net gain of two provinces for the centre-left since 2001.

What does this tell us about the strength of the various parties?

First, it remains a handy rule of thumb that Forza Italia performs better when Silvio Berlusconi is running for office. Forza Italia’s performance in certain parts of the country was dire – polling less than 10% in Rome, for example. Whether this also involves a differential turnout effect is unclear.

Second, given this, it was foolish of Berlusconi to stake so much on these elections as the first test of the new Prodi government. (This is the argument of Paolo Franchi’s editorial on te front page of Corriere della Sera). Over the next few months, it will be interesting to see whether Berlusconi’s hard-nosed oppositionism succeeds, or whether Berlusconi will lose the co-operation of the UDC and (less likely) certain parts of Alleanza Nazionale.

Third, the centre-right seems to have a considerable problem in grooming leaders for the local or regional level. That is to say, centre-left mayoral candidates outpolled their parties; centre-right mayoral candidates were a drag on the ticket. See the graphic below.

Fourth, it’s difficult to tell whether this election provides further ammunition for those who wish to see a single party of the left. Repubblica made much of the success of the united left in Torino, with Sergio Chiamparino, a supporter of the united party idea, as capolista.

Fifth, it doesn’t seem that this contest will either buoy or weaken the government. Prodi can maintain his ’serenita`’.