Political independence, accountability, and the quality of regulatory decision-making


Chris Hanretty

Christel Koop


March 28, 2017


Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system.


The version accepted by the journal can be found here. The (gated) version of record can be found here.

Replication data

Replication data can be found at the Harvard Dataverse


Hanretty, Chris, and Christel Koop. 2018. “Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making.” Comparative Political Studies 51 (1): 38–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017695329.